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Abstract
Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many
situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is even-
tually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider policies to guide an agent
in choosing who to delegate to when such recursive interactions are possible. These
policies, based on quitting games and multi-armed bandits, were empirically tested for
effectiveness. Our results indicate that the quitting game based policies outperform those
which do not explicitly account for the recursive nature of delegation.
1 Introduction
Task delegation is a common feature of multi-agent systems. Agents seeking to increase the
likelihood of successful task achievement may decide to hand it over to more experienced
agents. For example, an agent representing an user may delegate a transport booking task
to a travel agent, as the latter has more expertise in the domain than the former. Much of
the research within the field of trust and reputation, e.g. principal-agent theory and multi-
armed bandit problems, has considered the problem of who to delegate to when maximising
the likelihood of success, how to price such delegation requests, and how to learn from
them. However, to our knowledge, nearly all such work has considered a single instance of
delegation [7, 1, 14, 20]. That is, a delegation request is generated from one agent to another,
whence the process is terminated.
In this paper, we consider consecutive requests reaching some agent at the end of a dele-
gation chain, who finally executes the task. We show that in an environment where the com-
petency of others is initially unknown or partially known, existing approaches –concerned
with a single level of delegation– are not optimal. We analyse the problem of recursive task
delegation through the lens of game theory, formulating a quitting game mechanism that
allows for either consecutive delegation, or immediate execution.
We demonstrate empirically that such a game theoretic approach outperforms more tra-
ditional strategies, namely −greedy, UCB1, and Gittins Index guided partner selection. The
main contributions of this paper rest on the formal representation of recursive delegation as
both a quitting game and a multi-armed bandit problem, along with the generation of empir-
ical evidence on their relative performance. In particular, it is shown that the quitting game
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surpasses existing techniques, in terms of the speed of convergence and the quality of the
overall solution.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the Gittins Index,
Upper Confidence Bound algorithms, and quitting games are introduced. Section 3 presents
our principal contribution: the recursive delegation problem is formalised by considering
agents capable of delegating along a tree, and the implementation of the corresponding quit-
ting game explained. We proceed to evaluate our approach in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
the analysis with a discussion of our results and related work.
2 Background: Optimal Indexing, Optimism, and Quit-
ting Games
We begin this section by describing the multi-armed bandit problem and its solution through
the application of the Gittins Index [10]. Multi-armed bandit problems are often used to
reason about how exploration and exploitation of resources should take place in an uncertain
or unknown environment. In the context of delegation they rationalise the selection of the
agent to be entrusted with the task. Following this, we describe UCB algorithms and quitting
games.
2.1 Multi-Armed Bandits
Sequential decision problems are usually represented as multi-armed bandits (MABs). A
single agent repeatedly selects one among finitely many actions, obtaining a stream of re-
wards subject to an unknown stochastic process. Rewards are additive and discounted in
time.
Definition 2.1 (Multi-Armed Bandit Problem [19]). A Multi-armed bandit is a tupleM =
〈(Ai, xi, ri, fi)i∈N ,w〉. A single agent selects one state from Ai = {inactive, active} 7→
{0, 1} affecting one arm xi among N = {0, . . . , N}, during T trials. ri and w denote the
reward attached to the ith arm, and a vector of independent random variables. The agent’s
decision, for a time-discounting parameter β ∈ [0, 1], is given by the following elements:
Local Time (of an Arm): ni(t), t = {0, 1, . . . , T}. Number of times an arm is operated.
Arm: {xi(ni(t)), ri(xi(ni(t)));ni(t) = {0, 1, . . . , t}}. Arms are fully characterised by
their state (xi(·)) and reward (ri(·)).
Policy: A rule γt dictating the current control action u(t), such that:
u(t) ≡ γt : ×Ni=1zi ×t−1m=1 u(m)→
N⋃
i=1
ei
where: ej = (
N arms︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, 0, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j arms
, ..., 0),
zi(t) := [xi(0), xi(1), ..., xi(t)].
Evolution Rules (ER):
xi(ni(t+ 1)) =
{
fni(t)(xi(0), ..., xi(ni(t)), wi(ni(t))) , ui(t) = 1
xi(ni(t)) , ui(t) = 0
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where:
ni(t+ 1) =
{
ni(t) + 1 , ui(t) = 1
ni(t) , ui(t) = 0
,
ui(t)) =
{
ri(x(ni(t+ 1))) , ui(t) = 1
0 , ui(t) = 0
.
Agent’s Optimisation Problem:
V (γ, T ) := maxγE[
T∑
t=0
β
t
N∑
i=1
ri(xi(ni(t)), ui(t)) | z(0)] s.t. ER.
The Gittins Index solves MABs optimally. It assigns each arm a dynamically calculated
value. During each trail, the optimal strategy amounts to selecting the highest valued arm.
Proposition 2.1 (Gittins Index [28]). There exist functions:
Gi(zi(t)) = sup
σ>0
E[
∑σ−1
t=0 β
tri(xi(t)) | zi(0) = zi]
E[
∑σ−1
t=0 β
t | zi(0) = zi]
,∀i ∈ N
such that a policy γ∗ activating the arm
xn, n ∈ argmax
m∈{0,...,N−1}
{Gm(zm(t))}
is optimal, for a time-discounting parameter β ∈ [0, 1]. The function Gm(·) is calculated
from the dynamics of the stochastic process alone. The function and value it returns is
referred to as the Gittins Index.
Alternative approaches rely on heuristics or additional variables such as regret (the dif-
ference between the sum of the best possible outcome and the sum of actual rewards), risk
(the variance of the expected reward), or optimism (the value of the upper confidence bounds
on the expected rewards):
UCB: Estimate a ceiling for each arm’s reward, updating the resulting Upper Confidence
Bound (UCB) after every realisation. UCB1 guarantees asymptotically logarithmic
regret [2].
-Greedy: Sweeps through the available set of arms before selecting the most rewarding
with probability , shifting to a random arm with probability 1−  [9].
Risk-Averse: Require some previous knowledge on the value of the optimal arm, as to
achieve a randomised policy that attains uniformly bounded risk over finite time [25].
Variations of these give rise to the algorithms employed in different versions of MABs,
from superprocesses [6] to risk-averse bandits [25], via contextual [18], arm-acquiring [29]
and restless [3] bandits. Non-frequentist bandits also use UCB on the posterior knowledge
of rewards to guide the exploratory stage of the process [21].
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2.2 Upper Confidence Bound Algorithms
Regret, or the gap between the cumulative expected reward from the best arm available
(
∑
t∈{1,...,T} µ
∗) and the cumulative expected reward induced by the solution of interest
(E [V (γ, T )]), is considered a valid criterion of performance.
Commonly computed as [2]:
Regret(γ, T ) := µ∗T − E[V (γ, T )],
it has become the default policy objective for many algorithms, due to its practical and
intuitive appealing. The UCB family, as briefly mentioned, is among them.
UCB algorithms are based on the idea that an optimistic guess on the available arms
is a good way to achieve minimal regret. Formally, the probability of deviating from the
mean expected reward dictates the construction of the upper bound, as prescribed by the
Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality [13]. If {xi}i∈N are independent random variables satisfying
P (bi ≤ xi ≤ ci) = 1, then for X :=
∑N
k=1 xk, µ := E[X], and all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}:
P (X − µ ≥ t) ≤ e−2t2/
∑
(ci−bi)2 .
A sensible choice of parameters recasts the above expression into:
P (X − µ ≥ a(t, i)) ≤ e−2nia2 , a(T, i) =
√
2Log(T )/ni,
suggesting the existence of an exponentially decaying upper bound for the mean dispersion
of rewards:
P (X + a(t, i) ≥ µ) ≤ T−4.
In contrast to the Gittins Index, which guarantees Ω(
√
NT ) expected regret on MABs,
UCB1 is an optimistic algorithm, i.e., it aims at the maximisation of a(·), known to achieve
O(
√
NTlogT ) regret [11]. Its “delegational” interpretation is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
UCB1 also secures a theoretical upper bound on regret:
Proposition 2.2 (UCB1’s Theoretical Upper Bound [2]). UCB1 attains regret that is at
most:
8
∑
i:µi<µ∗
log(T )
δi
+
(
1 +
pi2
3
) K∑
j=1
δj
where δi := µ ∗ −µi.
Solutions akin to an optimistic version of the Gittins Index offer a slightly different view
on the bounds of optimal regret minimisation for standard MABs. That is, if the notion of
a retirement value is invoked as to facilitate the index’s computation [11], it can be demon-
strated that:
Proposition 2.3 (Optimistic Gittins Theoretical Bound [11]). An Optimistic Gittins solu-
tion for MABs, achieves an upper bound on regret given by:
Regret(γ, T ; θ) ≤
∑
i 6=i∗
(1 + ) (θ∗ − θi)
d (θ∗, θi)
log(T ) + C (, θ)
where θj denote the success probability per trial, parametrising the prior distribution over {xi}i∈N .
This result not only bridges UCB heuristics with a principled approach to MABs, but
also establishes lower bounds for regret, matching Lai and Robbins’ [17]. In fact, it has been
proved that a greedy strategy with respect to the simplest of those optimistic approximations
to the Gittins Index, agrees with Proposition 2.2.
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Algorithm 1 UCB1 Delegation
Input: {ai, adi}i∈N : Tuples of agents and their neighbours,
K: Number of neighbours per agent.
Output: S: Sequence of agents to whom its has been delegated to, µ: Array of rewards.
2: procedure UCB1(a;K)
S ← ∅, µ← {µi}i∈N , µi ∼ Beta(1, 1).
4: for j=1→ N do
adi ← {aj}j 6=i, CountSuccessa(·)j ← 0
6: αj = CountSuccessaj , βj = CountSuccessak∈adj
µj ← 11+βj/αj
8: Delegate to am = argmax(µm +
√
2log(trials)/(αm + βm)
S ← S ∪ {am}
10: if Outcome == True then
CountSuccessai ← CountSuccessai + 1
12: else
CountSuccessam ← CountSuccessam + 1
14: return Outcome
The superior empirical performance and lighter computational burden of the UCB fam-
ily, to which its popularity is attributed, can also be attained through algorithms engendered
by directly tackling the analytical formulation of MABs. Consequently, it seems reasonable
to expect that game-theoretic approaches, relying on an explicit representation of the actual
interaction among different agents, have the potential to bring about greater accuracy not
necessarily penalised by lack of practicality.
2.3 Quitting Games
Stochastic games with embedded actions characterise both sequential and recursive prob-
lems. They bring forth the importance of agency through strategic interaction. Quitting
games, a sub-class of stochastic games, provide a good example.
A quitting game (QG) presents agents with continuing (c) or quitting (q) as the only
possible actions. It is framed in a finite time horizon and the rewards are collected whenever
q is played or the game’s terminal time is reached.
Definition 2.2 (Quitting Game). A quitting game is a pair (N , {rs}S⊆N ), where N =
{1, . . . , N} indicates the number of players, and rS the rewards obtained once a subset
S ⊆ N quits the game.
Actions: Ai = {ci, qi},∀i ∈ N .
Strategy: (xit) : T → [0, 1],∀i ∈ N , where xit is the probability of the ith player playing ci
at trial t ∈ T ⊆ N+.
Profile: x := (xt)t∈T . It induces a probability distribution Px over the set of actions. Ex
denotes the corresponding expectation operator.
Expected Pay-off: vi(x) := Ex[rSτ Iτ<∞],∀i ∈ N , for terminating time τ = inf {t, St 6=
∅}.
For two agents the game in normal form appears in Table 1. The first entry in each
pair corresponds to Agent0’s pay-off, the other is Agent1’s. Thus, for example, whenever
(c0, q1) is played, Agent0 receives b0 and Agent1 gets b1. (c0, c1) continues the game
leading to yet unrealised rewards, this situation is represented by “	”.
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Table 1: Normal Form of a Quitting Game
Agent1
c1 q1
Agent0
c0
q0
	
(a0 , a1 )
( b0 , b1 )
( d0 , d1 )
For a0 > 0, a1 < d1, d0 < b0, and a1 ≥ b1, the stationary profile (x0, c1), x0t  1 is
an − equilibrium. More generally, in [23] it is proved that for every quitting game where
players prefer unilateral termination to indefinite continuation there exists a cyclic subgame
perfect  − equilibrium; and in [24] it is shown that two and three players QG’s have an
stationary − equilibrium of the kind just presented.
Proposition 2.4 (− equilibria in Quitting Games [24]). Let  > 0. Any game satisfying:
ri{i} = 1,∀i ∈ N ; and riS ≤ 1,∀i ∈ S; has a cyclic subgame perfect − equilibrium.
Repeated delegation might be sub-optimal even for a non-binding time restriction, were
it feasible to map the decision problem directly onto a QG. It is not only a matter of selecting
the fittest agent available for the task, but also finding out whether those higher up in the
delegation chain could have achieved a better expected outcome by delegating to others.
The resemblance to the exploration/exploitation-dilemma in MABs is more than apparent.
The Gittins Index, UCB1 and quitting games reflect different features of delegation.
The Gittins Index synthesises the multidimensionality of the dynamic optimisation problem
behind decision making. UCB1 provides a practical alternative to the computationally de-
manding calculation of the index; while game-theoretical models assert the strategic aspect
of delegation by exploiting potentially conflicting objectives. To build upon these obser-
vations a delegation problem in the form of a quitting game will be evaluated using three
different extensions of multi-armed bandits as benchmarks.
3 Approach: Delegation and Games
MABs provide an appropriate framework for modelling delegation, at certain risks. Sen et
al. (2015), for instance, evaluated algorithms drawn from the greedy family over different
tree-like networks, running on a standard Gaussian process. The variable of interest was the
cost-benefit ratio of the arm activation.
The high rewarding task executioners were identified, employing budgetary restrictions
to probe for reliability, while agents’ motives remained independent of one another as if
there were no actual handing-over of a task, but the mere repetition of a discarding process.
However the dependency of those who have been delegated to, as potential agents of dele-
gation, on the latter’s already constituted objectives should be the driving force behind the
“delegational” interpretations of MABs. It appears that such dependency lies at the heart of
its recursive nature.
Given this we opted for a dynamic indexing adaptation of MABs that used the Gittins
Index. Because of its analytical derivation and optimal properties, exclusively based on the
history of past delegations, the decision seemed consequential.
Noting that decisions can be associated with a binary random variable keeping track
of successful and failed choices, a Bernoulli process is a good description of monitoring
behaviour throughout delegation. For a large number of trials (N ), and a parameter (δ),
discounting future rewards at a rate c, i.e., δ = e−c, in (0.8, 1], the Gittins Index may be
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approximated with a closed-form function [5]:
G(N) ≈ µ+
√
µ(1− µ)
N + 1
ψ
(
1
(N + 1)c
)
µ is the mean of the compound (Beta) distribution of the random variable indicating a suc-
cessful delegation, and
ψ(τ) =

√
τ/2 , τ ≤ 0.2
0.49− (0.11τ)−1/2 , τ ∈ (0.2, 1]
0.63− (0.26τ)−1/2 , τ ∈ (1, 5]
0.77− (0.58τ)−1/2 , τ ∈ (5, 15]
{2log(τ)− loglog(τ)− log(16pi)}1/2 , otherwise
is, in turn, the approximation to the boundary of the continuation region C = {(z, s) :
z > −b(s)} for an optimal policy γ∗ dependent on the stopping time τ , in accordance with
the notation in Definition 2.1 and Proposition 2.1. Algorithm 2 (DID) summarises all these
elements.
Algorithm 2 Dynamically Indexed Delegation (DID)
Input: A := {ai, adi}i∈N : Tuples of agents and their neighbours,
K: Number of neighbours per agent, δ: Time-discounting parameter.
Output: S: Sequence of agents receiving a delegation request, µ: Array of rewards.
2: procedure DL(A;K)
S ← ∅, µ← {µi}i∈N , µi ∼ Beta(1, 1).
4: for j=1→ N do
adi ← {aj}j 6=i∈K , CountSuccessaj ← 0, δj ← [0.8, 1)
6: αj = CountSuccessaj , βj = CountSuccessak∈adj
µj ← 1(1+βj/αj))
8: Gi ← µj +
(µj(1−µj)
αj+βj+1
)1/2ψ(1/(αj + βj + 1)log(δ−1i ))
Delegate to am = argmax({Gk}k∈adi )
10: S ← S ∪ {am}
if Outcome == True then
12: CountSuccessai ← CountSuccessai + 1
else
14: CountSuccessam ← CountSuccessam + 1
return Outcome
A standard greedy algorithm, following the description in Section 2 was also consid-
ered an appropriate accompanying benchmark, as it is not yet clear whether the algebraic
and topological characteristics of a delegation problem allowed for greediness to be opti-
mal. Along with the MAB extension, they will both serve as a point of reference for QG’s.
Algorithm 3 (-greedy) gives a full characterisation.
QG’s on the other hand seem more than fitting for modelling the latency of sequential
subdelegation. They have been explicitly conceived for representing the opening of new
instances of the problem that gives rise to the whole game. Thus delegation problems will
be cast as delegation games.
Definition 3.1 (Delegation Game). A Delegation Game is characterised by the tuple G =
〈N, (Ai, U i, ri)i∈N , x〉, where every agent inN = {1, . . . , N} has the following attributes:
Actions: Ait := {dit, eit},∀i ∈ N . ∆(Ai) is the set of all probability distributions over the
set of agent i’s actions.
Startegy: (xit) : Ai → [0, 1],∀i ∈ N , where xit is the probability of the ith player playing
dit.
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Profile: xi := (xit)t∈T . It induces a probability distribution Px ∈ ∆(A) over the set of
actions.
Rewards: rit : ×j∈N∆(Aj)×Dt → R,∀i ∈ N is a Lebesgue measurable function repre-
senting the gains from delegation for each player at stage t ∈ T ⊆ N+ when a set of
agents Dt have been delegated to.
Updating Rule: ui : At−1 × R→ ∆(Ai) is a measurable set-valued function that dictates
the transition from one state of the system to a potentially different profile.
The Delegation Game falls into one of three states: continuous delegation (sc), immedi-
ate execution of the task by another agent (sm), or self-execution of the task (se). The last
two are absorbing since no agent can leave once they are reached.
Table 2: Normal Form of a Delegation Game
e1
e0 (Y0, 0)
se
d1 e1
d0 	 (X0, Y1)
e0 (Y0, 0) (Y0, 0)
sc
d1
d0 (X0, Y1)
sm
The agent receiving the task is chosen by comparing the discounted expected values at
t, attached to the decision of whether delegating or not i.e.,
vi(x∗) ≥ vi(xi, x−i),∀xi ∈ ∆(Ai)
It is a more robust solution concept than the one in Proposition 2.4. This approach to its em-
pirical evaluation would provide evidence of the potential optimality of the game-theoretic
approach to delegation, and also induce the exploration of Nash equilibria or related refine-
ments for this sub-class of games. Algorithm 4 describes its application to Definition 3.1.
Algorithm 3 -Greedy Delegation
Input: A := {ai, adi}i∈N : Tuples of agents and their neighbours, : Array of greedy parameters, K: Number
of neighbours per agent.
Output: S: Sequence of agents receiving a delegation request,
µ: Array of rewards.
2: procedure ED(A;K)
S ← ∅, µ← {µi}i∈N , µi ∼ Beta(1, 1).
4: for j=1→ N do
adi ← {aj}j 6=i∈B , CountSuccessaj ← 0, δj ← (0, 1), j ← (0.05, 0.1)
6: αj = CountSuccessaj , βj = CountSuccessak∈adj
µj ← 11+βj/αj
8: if random() < j then
Delegate to am s.t. ∃m 6= i,m ∈ adi
10: else
Delegate to am = argmax({µk}k∈adi )
12: S ← S ∪ {am}
if Outcome == True then
14: CountSuccessai ← CountSuccessai + 1
else
16: CountSuccessam ← CountSuccessam + 1
return Outcome
In Algorithm 4, a set of K neighbours is assigned to each agent, and their respective
rewards sampled from an uniform distribution. The resulting initial state allows the compu-
tation of individual mixed strategies,i.e., the probabilities of delegating, whenever pairs of
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agents and neighbours engage in a delegation request. As long as there are neighbours who
have not received such a request, despite holding a positive probability of delegating, the se-
lection of the one with the highest expected pay-off will take place. If capable of executing
the task, as given by a random “state of nature”, this latter agent will have to weigh up the
possibility of passing the task down the delegation chain or attempt its completion, thereby
triggering a learning process.
Algorithm 4 Delegation Game (DIG)
Input: {ai, adi}i∈N : Tuple of agents and their neighbours,
K: Number of neighbours per agent, r: Array of sampled rewards.
Output: S: Sequence of agents receiving a delegation request, x: Array of mixed strategies.
2: procedure DELEGATE(x, r;K)
S ← {Si}i∈N , x← {xi}i∈N , µ← {µi}i∈M , r ← {ri}i∈N
4: for j=1→ N do
adj ← {ak}k 6=j∈B , rj ← {U(rj,0, rj,T )}j∈B ,Sj ← ∅,xj ← 0
6: for ak ∈ adj do
xj,k =
rj,1−rk,0
rj,2−rk,0
8: x← x ∪ {xj,k}
while (x 6= ∅) ∧ (∃j[Sj == ∅]) do
10: m = argmaxj∈B(r)
if (random() < xj,m) then
12: Delegate to am
if am ∈ Sj then
14: Update xj,m, rj,m
else am /∈ Sj
16: Sj ← Sj ∪ {am}
return LEARN(xm, rm;K, aj )
18: else
aj executes the task
20: Sj ← ∅
return (S, x)
procedure LEARN(xk, rk;K, ai)
2: if rk,0 ≤ rk,1 then
ak executes the task
4: Update xi,k, rj,m
else
6: return DELEGATE(xk, rk;K)
4 Evaluation
All four implementations consisted of 1000 trials over 100 runs. DID, UCB1, and -greedy,
required networks modelled after the stable state of the system given by Algorithm 4 (DIG):
each agent has 5 neighbours, and may reach up to 4 levels of delegation, in correspondence
with the game’s final state, whose initial delegation chain was unconstrained.
The parameter () in Algorithm 3 took on values in [0.05,0.1], as seems standard in
related work [22, 15, 4]. The discount factor in Algorithm 2 (DID) was set to between
[0.8,1), as to remain consistent with the closed-form approximation to the Gittins index. The
initial probabilities of delegation were sampled from an uninformative Beta distribution.
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Figure 1: Comparative Performance of the Algorithms
In accordance with Definition 3.1, d (x in Algorithm 4) represents the underlying bino-
mial random variable, keeping track of the probability of delegating. Since it determines the
pattern of interaction and, ultimately, the solution to the delegation problem, it is the focus of
our attention. The subsequent priors correspond to Beta distributions for an uninformative
initial state i.e., x ∼ Beta(α = 1, β = 1). The posteriors belong to the same family i.e.,
x ∼ Beta(α+ d, β + d).
Figure 1.a summarises the performance of all three algorithms. -greedy seems to induce
occasional exploratory attempts even after the best solution has been identified, while Gittins
struggles to find the right neighbours, given the structure of the problem. The game, on the
other hand, finds the optimal strategy rather easily. The continuous quitting of players along
different links of the final chain leads to agents with the adequate set of opportunity costs,
opening up a path to an optimal solution.
Algorithm Final Probability of SuccessfulExecution
Mean Rate of
Convergence
Mean
Regret
DIG 0.931 95%CR[0.930,0.933] 0.441 7.124
DID 0.910 95%CR[0.907,0.913] 0.410 20.939
-Greedy 0.898 95%CR[0.894,0.902] 0.364 37.400
UCB1 0.896 95%CR[0.893,0.898] 0.344 26.860
Table 3: Relative Performance of the Algorithms
Table 3 reports the (posterior) probability of a successful delegation, in the context of
each algorithm’s credible region, mean rate of convergence1, and mean regret as defined
before. The credible regions indicate that there is a 95% probability of finding the true
probability within CR[·,·]. The rate of convergence reflects the speed at which the sequence
of probabilities approaches 1.
Figure 1.a shows that DIG and DID display higher probabilities of delegation at faster
paces of convergence, whereas the heuristic based policies report statistically indiscernible
values of all three criteria, with the exception of Mean Regret as UCB1 is specifically de-
signed to attain optimal regret.
1The mean rate of convergence was approximated by the error of deviating from a probability of delegating
equal to 1 (et), over the first 175 trials i.e., q ≈ log(et+1/et)
log(et/et−1)
, t ∈ {1, . . . , 175}. The cut-off point was obtained
through the Welch method [27].
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Figure 1.b provides additional support to previous results. It presents each algortihm’s
behaviour with respect to the theoretical upper bound given by Proposition 2.2. Despite
being a feature of UCB1 only, the upper bound was calculated for every algorithm, in order
to have a common point of reference. -greedy performs quite poorly, barely staying within
the bound. UCB1 does fulfill the prediction, but cannot keep up with DID. DIG seems to
attain a desirable pattern of delegation, which might also explain a certain tolerance for slight
drops in performance conducent to increases in the levels of regret.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that a game-theoretical approach to delegation is empirically superior to
existing techniques for solving either a single delegation instance or a supply-chain request
(as in [22]) modelled after MABs. Delegation does not arise as a direct extension of MABs.
It, rather, involves multiple loci of agency in constant interaction.
However different from MABs, delegation does share certain similarities, which has led
most of the research in the field towards the study of the Gittins Index, Upper Confidence
Bound algorithms, and greedy explorations of the domain. In this paper, UCB1, -greedy,
and a closed-form approximation to the Gittins Index (DID) did not only serve as solution
templates; their advantages, analytical and practical ones, were put to the test. More im-
portantly, delegation was formulated in terms of a quitting game, i.e., as a delegation game
(DIG). The motivation behind this was to evaluate the performance of an algorithm explicitly
conceived for modelling recursive decision-making subject to uncertainty.
The probability of delegating, the mean rate of convergence, and the mean levels of
regret were used as evaluation criteria. DIG outperformed the other algorithms. It delivered
higher probabilities of delegation, at faster rates with lower regret, even surpassing DID -the
analytically proven optimal solution to MABs [9].
We believe that further exploration of the results presented here along the lines of hi-
erarchical reinforcement learning [12], feudal learning [8], and more recent applications of
Q-learning [16, 26], have the potential of delivering decisive contributions to AI. Determin-
ing DIG’s computational complexity, and the formal proof of its optimality in relation with
the associated combinatorial problem, are left for future work.
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